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The Lawgiving Self: Kant on the Natural Law Tradition and the Dignity of Others

摘要

In his moral philosophy, Kant argues that rational beings are dignified ends in themselves because of their capacity to give law through the will, that is, their capacity for autonomy, making all rational beings moral lawgivers. With this argument, Kant rejects the natural law tradition. According to the natural lawyers, knowledge of the moral law follows from an a posteriori examination of the human condition. However, for Kant, this methodology can only account for hypothetical imperatives, not a categorical imperative. Instead, Kant argues that moral philosophy must proceed from basic principles that are known a priori. He restricts his analysis of the foundational concepts at work in morality to what can be known about rational nature in general, excluding all distinctively human features. In doing so, Kant breaks with natural law theory and its a posteriori method, allowing him to navigate around the fundamental flaws of natural law theory and establish a true moral philosophy grounded in autonomy, from which the strict duty to treat others as ends in themselves follows.

關鍵詞

Kant, autonomy, dignity, categorical imperative, natural law theory, a priori, rational nature